IPBES' conceptual framework, and the related debates prior to its adoption, provided an interesting opportunity to witness an old and ongoing tension between two value systems, namely an "economic" and utility-based value system, and a "cultural" and comprehensive value system. Arguments for and against both value systems relate, at least partly, to criteria such as practicality, democracy, comprehensiveness and respect for various forms of worldviews. However, disputes regarding the legitimacy of these value systems mostly rest on theoretical ground since they generally focus on the potential threats and future promises of approaches related to these value systems, rather than on their actual impacts and performance. This article aims to contribute to filling this gap.
negotiation process (Borie and Hulme 2015) . Trying to somehow reconcile these alternative views, the conceptual framework (CF) reflects the coexistence of two semantic fields and types of notions, in the text as well as in its now famous Figure 1 (Diaz et al. 2011; IPBES 2013, 2 (see also below)). These two value systems 1 can be characterized as follows: on the one hand, a system based on the expression of the services which nature provides to humanity and the economic values which can be attributed to them (which will be dubbed hereafter "the economic value system"); and, on the other, a system based on cultural, spiritual and philosophical references transcending these relations and also intending to express the diversity of the relationships between mankind and its environment (dubbed "the cultural value system" after).
These two systems have long been in competition. Tension between them is generally expressed through a criticism or defense of the economic value system and more specifically ecosystem services valuation (Toman 1998; Gomez-Baggethun et al. 2010; Norgaard 2010; Meinard and Grill 2011; Sagoff 2011; Centemeri 2015; Melathopoulos and Stoner 2015) . These critical positions can be summarized as follows. According to its promoters, the strength of the economic value system is its neutrality and its positive (as opposed to normative) approach to decision-and policy-making (Pearce 1998) . By allowing for the measurement of values in a refutable way, and their comparison with other social costs and benefits, Ecosystem Services Valuation (ESV) is supposed to support transparent, universal and, overall, democratic decision-making (Freeman III 2003) . Its second alleged 
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Y. Laurans strength is its efficiency in "making the case" for biodiversity: considering the domination of economic dimensions in the world today, economic valuation is seen as a means to make biodiversity "visible", thus enabling it to be factored into decision-making (Bingham et al. 1995; Arrow et al. 1996; Costanza et al. 1997; Heal 2000) . Conversely, the economic value system is often criticized for enacting the domination of the economy on other social spheres, and correspondingly the domination of economics over other approaches to environmental and social issues. More precisely, two main lines of critiques can be characterized: (1) economic analysis and ESV tend to over-simplify and impoverish the representation of relations between societies and their environment, in addition to being unable to give an account of the future relations between humanity and the biosphere (Schultze 1994) ; and (2) they are instruments serving the commodification of nature and more generally paving the way for extending the market sphere to things and beings that were formerly held apart from it: pricing of natural objects opens the way for exchanging these objects with other goods and services (McCauley 2006; Castree 2008; Spash 2011) .
Symmetrically, promoters of the "cultural" value system put forward its ability to factor in the cultural diversity of humanity as well as the various reasons why we may feel attached to the biosphere, and the fact that this system is able to integrate all dimensions of biodiversity. Although there are many differences within this value system and it is certainly not a monolithic block, promoters generally praise it for its openness to all forms of knowledge, and its ability to give consideration to tangible as well as intangible components, material and immaterial dimensions, present and future issues (Tengö et al. 2014; Kok et al. 2016; Pascual et al. 2017) .
Among the alleged weaknesses of the cultural value system is its disputable ability to provide a basis for a transparent and democratic decision-making process, since priorities, trade-offs and collective choices are supposed to be based, at least partly, on normative and non-refutable points of view that do not necessarily reflect the preferences or interest of the majority within a given country or region. Its comprehensive and globalizing approach also means having to consider a very wide (if not infinite) range of criteria, and this is supposedly a practical difficulty for policy-and decision-making, bringing resistance from current institutions (Marlor 2010; Soberón and Townsend Peterson 2015) .
Let us notice that the contrast summarized above is mostly based on theory: strong as well as weak points of the two systems are mostly based on principles and a priori characteristics. To further reflect on this contrast and to propose complementarities between the two systems, we would like to bring empirical observations to light (following the approach developed by Guerry et al. 2015) . This article wishes to contribute to assessing how much these value systems actually keep their promises or carry out their threats. However, since the economic value system is more accused of domination and seems to have been more extensively used in the past, our analysis will only focus on economic analysis and its inclusion of biodiversity in public projects and policies. By observing its effectiveness in the practice of Official Development Agencies, which are supposed to be among the actors who use it most, the aim here is to determine the practical role of the economic value system in use and to infer suggestions to renew our approach to this value systems discord. Section 1 explains and justifies the choice of Official Development Agencies (ODAs) as testing fields for this purpose, and provides methodological details. Section 2 describes the decision-making process in ODAs. Section 3 defines how environmental criteria are factored into this process and section 4 elaborates on the role of economic calculation and ESV in this context, thus discussing the effective role of economic valuation and how it delivers or carries out its threats. A short discussion section comments on these results in light of the problem exposed in introduction, and a conclusion proposes reflections on the effectivity of the strong as well as the weak points of the economic value system so as to broaden our view of this contrast.
1. Official Development Banks as favourable observation fields for the economic value system at work To determine how ESV is capable of generating, or assisting, neutral, positive and democratic decision-making methodologies, it is useful to study organisations that are likely to be significant professional users of ESV and cost-benefit analysis (CBA; see Box 1), thus somehow testing the effectivity of the "economic" value system in use. International donors, or Official Development Agencies (ODAs), are in our opinion one of the most favourable cases for the use of instruments derived from the economic value system. Indeed, the economic assessment of projects, or CBA, was primarily developed and theorised in the 19th century, at a time when governmental authorities, whose decisionmaking power was little challenged, were implementing major infrastructure investment policies, while pursuing the goal of general economic development, with no decentralization, negotiations or contracts with any supra-or infra-state partners (Etner 1987) . Because of their autonomy and their investment in economic development and the general interest, ODAs can be considered as being in a situation relatively similar to that of the Western European and American states in the 19th century. More specifically, four characteristics of ODAs make them well suited to the use of CBA and ESV: (1) like governmental authorities in the 19th century, they have a relatively high level of autonomy in terms of decision-making and can handle the financing and running of projects; (2) like monopolistic authorities of the past, they are responsible for relatively precise and specific decisions on the advisability of supporting different projects; (3) also like governments, they are supposed to do so in the name of general interest objectives for development and public wellbeing, since they use public money for development objectives; and (4) they (and especially the World Bank) are reference sources in the literature on CBA, whether grey or scientific (; IUCN et al. 2004; ; World Bank IEG 2010) . It is useful to note here that the fundamental remit of ODAs is (economic) development: their whole organisation and culture are historically orientated towards producing welfare through growth and a structural change of domestic economies (Marschinski and Behrle 2007) . Environmental and social issues are therefore, at least initially, some kind of "additional criteria", on which it must be ascertained that development projects "do no harm". ESV is a means of assessing the importance of an "environmental cost or benefit", in other words the monetary value of the service lost or gained from the depletion or the improvement of a function, a species, a natural area, or a landscape, etc. As such, it is meant to contribute to costbenefit analysis (CBA), an economic analysis process used to predict whether a project will generate more benefits than costs. Given that some benefits and costs are "non-market", ESV is needed to factor such non-market values into CBA.
We can therefore say that ESV is a process for the monetary valuation of ecosystem services, and that the values produced using this method are (particularly) intended for integration into a CBA (Metrick and Weitzman 1998; Mishan and Quah 2007; Pearce et al. 2007 ).
Observing whether and how CBA and ESV are used by ODAs when they decide whether or not to support investment projects 2 with anticipated impacts on the local S104 Y. Laurans environment will hence be used here as a test of the effectivity of the economic value system in delivering according to its promises and / or threats (Box 2).
Box 2. Research methodology.
This section draws on research and preliminary publications done in 2010 and 2011 by Alexander Haddad and supervised by Yann Laurans (Haddad 2011) . Five ODAs were studied: the World Bank, French AFD (Agence Française de Développement), German KFW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau-Entwicklungsbank), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). These ODAs have different characteristics, particularly linked to their regulators and shareholders, and hence to their relations with states: bilateral banks (AFD and KFW), regional multilateral banks (EIB and IDB) and international multilateral banks (WB). In addition to analysis of the literature concerning these organisations, and of their institutional and professional literature, interviews were conducted with 42 different employees of these banks, selected for their position in the decision-making chain. These interviews were semi structured, based on a flexible list of questions. In certain institutions, we had the opportunity to meet renowned researchers in the field of environmental evaluation, whose publications were turned to good account. 6 2. Decision-making in Official Development Agencies: proposals and filters Despite their differences, the five ODAs that are the object of this study work in the same fields, and provide the same products and services (sovereign loans, non-sovereign loans and subsidies). As predicted by Woodward, and quoted by Mintzberg (1989) , organisations with identical objectives adopt the same "technology". The organisation of the five ODAs studied follows a common matrix pattern: first, units organised by geographical region, which we will call the "agencies", and second, units organised by technical field, which we will call the "thematic directorates", with both types of units working together to produce the ODA services, under the supervision of the senior management. Figure 2 below provides a simplified diagram of this organisation. The life-cycle of a project typically involves three phases, with two stages each, which are almost identical in the five ODAs, albeit under different names. Figure 2 . Schematic structure of the general organisation of the Official Development Agencies studied.
The initial phase, the creation or emergence of projects, first involves an identification stage, during which the teams investigate the fields and stakeholders in partner countries, analyse opportunities with operators in the country, assess these and discuss them in order to arrive at a preliminary draft. Next, the projects are prepared, and their scope is progressively specified and detailed (partners, components, scale, etc.) .
The decision concerning a project is thus characterized first by an "active" function, involving foresight, prospecting, development and "delivery" of the draft project. The agencies are largely responsible for this function. Since this stage of the process is about exploring opportunities, gathering energies and partnering, there is not yet much room for CBA and ESV, which are instruments made for comparing, selecting and rejecting least preferred options. Decision-makers of this phase rather need approaches and instruments that help with framing options, exploring shared interests and depicting desirable future outcomes of potential projects.
The emergence phase is followed by the investigation phase, during which the projects are assessed, audited and progressively adjusted to comply with the ODA's internal standards. The project resulting from the emergence phase goes through a series of "tests" to ensure it complies with the standards adopted by the organisation, which are themselves aimed at meeting the different quality criteria adopted by the ODAs. This investigation phase also includes two stages. The first is an appraisal stage, which is relatively open, during which the value of the project for the ODA's policy is assessed, and where it can still evolve considerably under the influence of the thematic directorates (through the addition or removal of certain elements or significant characteristics, for example). Then, during the approval stage, the project goes through a series of increasingly formal filters, which focus primarily on audits, before being formally approved by the board. This approval marks the end of the decision-making process itself. The average duration of the investigation between the initial registration of the project identification form (during the preparation stage) and the funding authorization by the board is, for example, 15 months at the French Agency for Development (AFD).
This phase therefore consists of a "passive" process involving selection and auditing, which submits a project to a series of tests to ensure that it presents the characteristics expected by the organisation according to specific criteria. It should also be noted that in the ODAs, decision-making is semantically designed in a way that clearly demonstrates this dual relationship between an active principle that "proposes" or "puts forward" the project (in phase 1 first, then along the auditing process of phase 2), and a passive principle that filters it: final approval, in the stage concerned, is called clearance, reflecting the fact that the final decision is seen as the end of a process of critical (passive) resistance to a driving (active) force for proposals.
The last phase is completion, with an operational stage of implementation followed by a final stage of closure, involving the ex-post evaluation of the project.
During the process leading up to the approval of a project, the active dimension is present at the beginning, and is gradually reduced over the course of the different stages, replaced by a growing passive dimension, until project approval. It is then to be noticed that only the second part of ODA's decision-making process is suitable to the use of instruments derived from the economic value-system. It is now time to enquire whether ODAs actually make use of such instruments in this decisionmaking phase. 
Organisation of the integration of environmental issues
In all of the ODAs studied, environmental issues on the one hand, and social issues on the other, are managed by the same teams. These teams always have a marginal position in the organisational chart, and may even be absent from it (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank). In all of the ODAs, teams of environmentalists and social science specialists are chiefly responsible for what are known as "environmental and social safeguards". Their function is to provide guarantees that ascertain they have attempted to avoid, minimize or offset any adverse environmental or social impacts.
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The role given to environmental issues is probably explained by the fact that the ODAs are essentially built upon economic and banking principles, as mentioned in section 1. Consequently, environmental and social approaches are mainly present -until recently -as limitations to the dominant rationale, and as guarantees that it will not produce any unacceptable adverse social or economic impacts, according to the standards specific to the ODAs. Therefore, the assessment of environmental and social impacts as criteria to be incorporated in the project evaluation methodology is congruent with the economic value-system paradigm, which is based on the idea that valuing the environmental benefits and costs is the best way to perform rational decision-making (Laurans and Mermet 2014).
The precautionary stages
The principle of establishing safeguards to avoid the negative consequences of projects has been progressively reinforced, as part of the filter process described above, to protect the ODAs from cases that could damage their reputation. This is particularly true of the World Bank, for which a series of environmental and social "scandals" caused serious problems, in the context of the major projects of the 1980s and early 1990s (especially dams, such as the Sardar Sarovar Dam in India).
Environmental precautions are taken at several stages during the process. One of the most significant of these is environmental and social classification, which takes place at the end of the preparation stage (see Figure 2 above). In all of the ODAs studied, this classification is carried out in a similar manner, according to a qualitative scale of increasing risks. The risk category is determined according to the type and size of the project and its potential impacts, to the sensitivity of the area affected and to technical criteria and thresholds. A similar classification exists for social issues (the classification finally chosen is the most stringent of the two). This classification then determines the precision and importance of the audits eventually carried out. At this stage of our analysis, two observations can be made: (1) the process leading to the decision concerning a public development assistance project is characterized by an active principle of proposal, and a passive principle of selection; (2) environmental issues are addressed in the passive part of the process, as a precaution, based on criteria guaranteeing that the project will "not do too much harm" to the environment, therefore in congruence with the economic value system paradigm. The next section determines how ESV and CBA are actually used within this organisation of decision.
4. The role of economic analysis in the decision-making process: an underutilised safeguard 4.1. A situation theoretically favourable to the use of economic analysis for decision-making As discussed above, and since ODAs resemble the centralized public authorities of the 19th century in terms of decision-making power, the ODA decision-making process is wellsuited to the use of an analysis tool aimed at assessing the advisability of a project or policy from the viewpoint of the general interest of a country or region.
CBA, and the monetary valuation of environmental benefits or costs, are tools designed for filtering and auditing (Arrow et al. 1996; Freeman III 2003; Pearce et al. 2007) . CBA is capable of providing an unequivocal ratio that can be used to clearly determine whether a given project provides society with additional well-being exceeding the costs of the project. It is difficult not to view this as one of the ideal "filters" of the passive part of the ODA decision-making process, and this is probably why these banks, and in particular the World Bank, have been significant producers of CBA methodology in the past. Economic principles are dominant criteria in the rationale of the ODAs, as we have shown, and as confirmed by the literature (see for example Marschinski and Behrle 2007, 24) . The World Bank adopted CBA from the 1970s onwards as the main tool for assessing the positive impacts of its projects. The World Bank Operational Manual includes an entire section on the Economic Evaluation of Investment Operations 4 (The World Bank 1994). Economic assessment is, to varying degrees depending on the ODA, established as one of the methods of arbitration in the passive phase of the decision-making process. 5 Based on these elements, we can therefore formulate the hypothesis that the ODAs do in fact make use of CBA in decision-making, insofar as they use it as a means of arbitration, when selecting, amending, rejecting or accepting the projects proposed. However, the case studies conducted in the five ODAs show that this hypothesis is not confirmed.
The use of CBA is declining
In 2010, the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) measured how many projects adopted by the World Bank Group had undergone a CBA process. The rate of costbenefit-analysed projects has decreased regularly and considerably, almost since the outset: from 75% of projects in 1970, it fell steadily to 25% in 2001, the final year of the study (World Bank IEG, 2010) . CBA, when completed, is generally performed by the project team itself, therefore with limited devoted staff. The quality of analyses produced was hence assessed as declining, and compliance with official recommendations appears limited.
Our own observations, and those made by Atkinson (2015) , revealed comparable situations for the other ODAs studied (result from interviews and documentation analysis). In all ODAs, it appeared that economic ratios were calculated for a decreasing proportion of projects, and with less and less sophisticated analyses.
Reasons given for implementation failures
Answers from the employees who took part in the IEG survey to explain the low rate of CBA implementation at the World Bank, as well as those we interviewed, suggest that CBA is not suited to this process, due to a lack of time and resources needed to gather the information required to quantify the benefits, and because of the excessive presence of non-market benefits in environmental issues: However, the IEG analyses, along with our own, first lead us to reject the hypothesis that the projects evaluated are unsuited to CBA per se. As observed in section 3, ODAs are rather typical of organisations for which CBA was conceived originally: they are rather autonomous and centralized decision-makers having to decide whether a public investment decision is collectively more profitable than an alternative use of the taxpayers' money. On the contrary, it seems that the projects evaluated are supposed to produce a combination of costs and benefits of different natures, some of them economic, others social or environmental. CBA and the monetization of environmental externalities through ESV are the economic tools designed for this particular case, and were initiated more than a century ago, while monetary environmental valuations have existed for more than 50 years.
Second, after analysis, the cost of conducting the study is marginal in relation to the cost of resources invested in the project, and to the internal resources invested in the decision-making process. The median cost stands at $16,000 per study, for projects whose total cost frequently ranges between $10 and $100 million, in other words contributions to transaction costs of 0.016-0.16% (World Bank IEG, 2010) .
It is therefore clear that CBA and ESV are not ruled out by the nature of projects, and that their costs do not appear to be in any way prohibitive for the ODAs. There must be other reasons to explain why the operators responsible for implementing these processes do not use this instrument, which is nevertheless mandatory in the "passive" second part of the process.
The observation produced by the study of the five ODAs is that the CBA is always positioned among the final stages of auditing in the passive decision-making phase. At first sight, there is no indication that this position is unfavourable to the use of CBA in decision-making: because its aim is to determine the advisability of a project, it must be able to establish a decision based on elements that have been sufficiently clarified by the investigation of proposals. Moreover it occurs at a time during the process when it remains theoretically possible to reject the project, to thoroughly revise it, or to amend it.
But observation refutes this theoretical property. We believe that this very characteristic of decision-making practices, associated with the limitations of non-market monetization, which explains the limited use of CBA and ESV for decision-making in the ODAs. In all of the ODAs, once a project has been presented by the project leader to the beginning of the filtering decision-making process, shelving it or amending it would be evaluated as an economic under-performance. Investment in ODA own resources (time spent by teams, and subcontracted studies) is already, at this stage, considered to be too high to abandon the project. Similarly, the external opportunities created (mobilization of partners in the client country) are seen as capital, which would be lost if the project were shelved. Lant Pritchett, quoted by McElhinny, summarised this perfectly: "Lant Pritchett, former World Bank economist and current professor at Harvard, was scathing in his remarks as panelist. In his years at the World Bank between 1988 and 2007, he observed that 'economic analysis played zero role in financing decisions … . to stop projects was a career killer'". (McElhinny 2010, 7 ).
This characteristic of the decision-making process is not formal; it is not derived from the established organisation, but rather from practice. It may also explain why other types of filters, precautions and various forms of environmental vigilance have been introduced, such as the risk classification system or risk assessments. These basic pre-evaluations are positioned earlier in the process, at a time when the thorough revision of projects is still possible, thereby limiting investment losses for the organisation.
It remains to be explained why an auditing instrument, typical of the economic value system, is not actually used by organisms adapted to its use to dismiss projects when the CBA concludes that their economic returns are insufficient. Why, in this case, do the ODAs not make it an advisability criterion capable of preventing them from making socially unprofitable investments? According to the rationale of the economic value system, even if it had invested in the preparation of a project, an organisation would not pursue its investment if an evaluation showed them that doing so would result in financial losses.
The main answer given concerns the reliability of the CBA methodology, and more specifically of the estimation of non-market costs and benefits. With the exception of the ODA economists themselves, ODA employees believe that the economic methodology for evaluating non-market values leaves ample room for the author to make arbitrary choices. This rules CBA out as a measurement instrument, and suggests doubts regarding its ability to support neutral, positive, transparent and democratic decision-making processes, although these are major "selling propositions" of the economic value system and of its typical instruments, as mentioned in introduction. First, non-market benefits or costs are not considered with the same level of certainty, robustness and practical reality as the others: they are not "black or white". Second, the employees believe that it is too often possible to manipulate the CBA so that it delivers the desired results. One EIB employee said: "Of course, some analyses are conducted by legal experts, for example, for whom things are either black or white. But for technicians and economists, things are often far more philosophical". The irruption here of "philosophical" rather than economic criteria is noteworthy, considering the remit and the nature of ODAs described above.
To sum up, first, the use of CBA seems to be declining in ODA decision-making processes. Second, when a CBA is carried out, its role in decision-making seems to fall short of expectations of an instrument for measuring the general advisability of a project, by integrating all costs and benefits of a given investment. CBA methodologies are considered to S110 Y. Laurans be too uncertain and arbitrary for this type of analysis to be seen as an objective measurement of the advisability of a project, which may require important choices to be made. It should be noted that these reservations do not apply to economic analysis in general, but above all to CBA, because of the need for it to integrate non-market aspects.
Discussion
Sections 2 and 3 aimed at assessing how prevalent the "economic value system" is in the functioning of organisations that are well suited for its influence, through the use of its privileged instruments, CBA and ESV. We have shown there that the five ODAs studied follow the same organisational pattern, which combines the units and functions responsible for identifying and preparing projects with the units and functions responsible for evaluating and amending these projects to ensure they meet the ODA acceptation criteria. Decision-making is thus represented by two complementary principles, one involving initiative, and the other evaluation. CBA is one of the environmental evaluation tests a development project is supposed to undergo during the decision-making process. But our analyses, supplemented by a previous study, reveal that the use of economic analysis is declining, and that its role as a test appears to be marginal, not to say inexistent.
These observations seem to be explained by (a) CBA and ESV being included in the final stages of the process, at a time when only very negative and very convincing tests could challenge a project, given the resources already invested in it, and (b) the fact that such instruments are not considered to be sufficiently conclusive for this by its potential users, due to a want of objectivity.
These results tend to shed a new light on the arguments for and against the economic value system and its typical practical instruments. If its ability to effectively influence decision-making is limited, then the threat of biodiversity commodification is also limited.
CBA and ESV have indeed long since been criticized. Within the community of environmental and resources economics, ecological economists proposed broadening the scope of the economic reasoning and better integrating qualitative criteria in the approaches to valuation (Martinez-Allier 1987; Daly and Farley 2010; Norgaard 2010) ; heterodox economics regularly voice concerns with respect to the reductionism and over-simplification brought by CBA (Lo and Spash 2013; Munda 2016) ; and philosophers have further criticized the idea of economic valuation of the environment for its tendency to obliterate the social deliberation process regarding values (O'Neill 2007). These criticisms are not contradicted by our observations. Such flaws of CBA and ESV are even one of the main reasons why they did not seem to be taken seriously enough for real-life and real-money decision-making, when decision had to be made on the basis of a go/no go arbitration over development projects.
Nevertheless, this flaw of the instruments of the economic value system may be rather specific to contexts where these instruments are meant to "measure benefits and costs". In practice, we have shown that economic analysis can be designed for many other purposes (Laurans et al. 2013; Laurans and Mermet 2014) . They can also be used as means to explore issues, justify policies, raise awareness, help design regulatory instruments, support participative processes … In all these "utilisation cases" however, economic analysis is in much less of an exclusive and dominant position. It is necessarily combined much more with other approaches and instruments, from social as well as natural sciences. Its role differs from purely instrumental assignments. Actually, if one sees economic analysis as a language that may be used to discuss wealth and interests, distribution, material interests, among other concerns and points of view, its potential contradiction with the "cultural" value systems partially fades out.
Conclusion
The practice of Official Development Agencies suggests that the use of cost-benefit analysis and ecosystem services valuation is much less likely to carry out the threats of commodification of nature than what is often said. The "economic" value system and its privileged instruments are also much less effective in shaping social deliberation processes as positive algorithmic rational procedures than what is expected by their promoters. This should bring us to renew our views on the discord between the value systems as was made visible in the debates before and after the adoption of the IPBES conceptual framework. Both value systems give birth to languages, concepts and representations that can be used as complementary rather than opposing resources, if only economic instruments are no longer considered as ways to mimic or even replace decision-making in a whole, but rather are taken as indispensable, however limited, tools to express views and to explore alternatives in terms of material interests, wealth and distribution. Subjects addressed by cognitive instruments issued from these value systems are partly different. However, they are potentially capable of illuminating the same issues with varied angles. As long as we do not stick to pure rationalist assumptions regarding decision-making processes and social deliberation procedures in general (Laurans, Leflaive, and Rankovic 2018) , value systems and their related instruments could prove usefully complementary to each other.
This suggests orientations to improve the balance between ecological and social scientists in IPBES assessment processes, thus concurring with, and somehow specifying the repeated calls for an enhanced participation of social sciences in the knowledge production processes of IPBES (Turnhout et al. 2012; Vadrot, Jetzkowitz, and Stringer 2016) . Economists, rather than being summoned to provide tests and black-or-white evidence regarding the economic importance of biodiversity, are good candidates to bring up the material interests involved in the policy processes that lead to biodiversity depletion (or protection). This would be worthwhile, in particular, to enlighten our understanding of the "underlying causes" of biodiversity depletion (Rankovic et al. 2016) . We indeed need to better understand how economic choices, constraints and opportunities are key drivers and major explanatory variables of biodiversity depletion worldwide, and how this relates to globalization. Although this is closely related to the "economic value system", it is fairly different from commodifying nature.
